Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of Probation - Criminals Find Refuge in the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 by Duffy, Seamus C.
Volume 31 Issue 2 Article 4 
1986 
Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of 
Probation - Criminals Find Refuge in the Provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
Seamus C. Duffy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Seamus C. Duffy, Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of Probation - Criminals Find 
Refuge in the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 591 (1986). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1986]
Notes
BANKRUPTCY: DISCHARGEABILITY OF RESTITUTIVE
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION-CRIMINALS FIND
REFUGE IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978
Robinson v. McGuigan
INTRODUCTION
With the rise of rehabilitative sentencing in the United States, the
concept of victim restitution has played an increasingly prominent role
in the disposition of criminal offenders, particularly as a condition of
probation.1 Under the typical statutory scheme, the criminal offender
tenders payments to the state, which then remits the money to the victim
in compensation for the losses suffered as a result of the criminal wrong-
doing.2 The victim normally has no right to enforce the restitution order
1. See generally Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime. Assessing the
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52, 57 (1982). Approximately two
thirds of the states have adopted some sort of victim compensation statute. See
ALA. CODE § 15-23-1 to -23 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(a)(2) (1984);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901(a), (f) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1203(2)(h) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1982); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-204(2)(e) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-201 to -218 (West 1978);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-1 to
-30 (1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 706-624(2)(h) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-6-3(b)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-7-2-1(a)(5)
(Burns 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610(4) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 533.030(3) (Baldwin 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895(A)(7) (West
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a, § 1204(2)(B) (1983); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 641(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1133 (Callaghan
Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (subd. 1) (West Supp. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-47(4), 99-37-5(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-2219(2)(j), 29-2262(2)0) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.185(3) (1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:45-1(B)(8) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(A)
(1981 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 6 5.10(2)(g) (Consol. Supp. 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 15a-1343(bl)(6), 15A-1343d (1983 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-32-07(2)(e) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(C) (Baldwin
1982 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(a) (West 1986); OR.
REV. STAT. § 137.106 (1985); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (Purdon 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-28-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201
(Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252(b)(6) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 19.2-
305 (1983 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.210(2) (1977 & Supp.
1986); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (1977); Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice, 87 ETHIcs 279 (1977).
2. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-806(A) (Supp. 1982-83) (authorizing
clerk of the court to administer restitutive payments); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-
(591)
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under state law. 3 Rather, the state enforces payment of restitution
through the threat of probation revocation proceedings upon default in
payment by the criminal offender.4
A complication arises with granting probation conditioned upon pe-
riodic restitution payments where the probationer subsequently files for
bankruptcy and attempts to have the restitution condition discharged. 5
The question of whether a criminal restitution obligation is a discharge-
able debt implicates two functionally contradictory policies underlying
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code).6
The Bankruptcy Code was intended, in part, to remedy a perceived
inadequacy in the relief afforded to consumer debtors under the old
Bankruptcy Act.7 In an effort to provide the consumer debtor with an
117(c) (Supp. 1985) (authorizing Department of Corrections to collect restitu-
tive payments and disburse money to victim); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-212(2)(Supp. 1985) (authorizing collection of restitutive payments by probation officer
for deposit in court registry from which victim is paid pursuant to court order).
Most courts have held that imposition of restitution along with incarceration is
improper unless specifically authorized by statute. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 156
N.J. Super. 559, 562, 384 A.2d 199, 201 (1978) (refusing to impose restitution
as part of custodial sentence where statutory authority is limited to probation
condition).
For a discussion of the rise of restitutive sanctions in the United States, see
OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION (B. Galaway & J. Hudson eds.
1977). For a discussion of the philosophical and jurisprudential justifications for
restitutive criminal sanctions, see Barnett, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42
Bankr. 129, 132-33 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (victim has no right to enforce resti-
tution requirement under Connecticut law); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 694(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (victim has no right to enforce restitution requirements
under New York law); see also Harland, supra note 1, at 108-19 (discussing en-
forcement of restitution awards).
4. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-2(a) (West Pamphlet 1982) (authorizing
probation revocation proceedings upon default on motion of person authorized
by law to collect restitution); see also Harland, supra note 1, at 108-19 (describing
various methods of enforcement employed by states). Although the state must
initiate the probation revocation proceedings, victims often accelerate the pro-
cess through informal pressure on state officials. See, e.g., United States v.
Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1975) (probation revocation proceeding for
default in restitution was initiated by government under "immediate pressure"
from victim).
5. See, e.g., Lewis and Jennings, Bad Checks and Bankruptcy: The Federal/State
Dilemma, 57 FLA. B.J. 531 (1983); Mehler, Criminal Prosecution and Restitution Under
the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 817; Schutz, Bankruptcy and the Prose-
cutor: When Creditors Use Criminal Courts to Collect Debts, 59 FLA. B.J. 11 (1985).
6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982); Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robin-
son), 776 F.2d 30, 31-38 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing clash of policies underlying
Bankruptcy Code where criminal debtor seeks discharge of restitutive condition
of probation), cert. granted sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
For a discussion of Robinson, see infra notes 91-129 and accompanying text.
7. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (Bankruptcy Act). The
House Report to the implementation of the Bankruptcy Code states:
[a] major problem under current bankruptcy law is the inadequacy of
relief that the Bankruptcy Act provides for consumer debtors. The last
2
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unencumbered "fresh start," Congress broadly defined "debts" subject
to discharge in a bankruptcy case. 8 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a
"debt" is defined as "liability on a claim," 9 and "claim" is defined as a
"right to payment" or a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of
major revision of the Bankruptcy Act was in 1938, before any significant
amount of consumer credit had been extended. In the post-War years,
consumer credit has become a major industry, and buying on time has
become a way of life for a large segment of the population. The bank-
ruptcy rate among consumers has risen accordingly, but without the
required provisions in the Bankruptcy Act to protect those who need
bankruptcy relief. This bill makes bankruptcy a more effective remedy
for the unfortunate consumer debtor.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 5965-66. Judge Hershner, a bankruptcy judge for the
Middle District of Georgia, summarized the law under the Bankruptcy Act prior
to 1978 as follows:
Section 57j dealt with the allowability of a claim; it did not address
the provability or dischargeability of a debt. The provability of a debt
was determined by Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act. Only those credi-
tors with provable debts were entitled to participate in the distribution
of the debtor's estate. The dischargeability of a debt was determined
by Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 17 released a bankrupt
"from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part"
subject to certain statutory exceptions. Thus, allowance, provability,
and dischargeability were separate determinations under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657, 658-59 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983)
(emphasis in original). One treatise describes the treatment of fines and penal-
ties under the Bankruptcy Act as follows:
The former Bankruptcy Act made no specific provision concerning
the dischargeability of fines and penalties due to a governmental unit,
but certain principles became well settled in this respect. Fines for vio-
lation of law, and forfeiture were not provable and therefore held not
to be dischargeable. Generally, fines and penalties were not affected by
discharge.
3 COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 523.17 (15th ed. 1985) (footnotes
omitted).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). The legislative history expresses the
Congressional intent to broaden the scope of bankruptcy relief:
Paragraph (4) [11 U.S.C. § 101(4)] defines "claim." The effect of
the definition is a significant departure from present law. Under pres-
ent law, "claim" is not defined in straight bankruptcy. Instead it is sim-
ply used, along with the concept of provabililty in Section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act, to limit the kinds of obligations that are payable in a
bankruptcy case. The term is defined in the debtor rehabilitation chap-
ters of present law far more broadly. The definition in paragraph (4)
adopts an even broader definition of claim than is found in the present
debtor rehabilitation chapters .... By this broadest possible definition
• . . the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no
matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6266 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the fresh
start policy of the Bankruptcy Code, see Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982).
3
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performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment."' 0
The policy of affording the consumer debtor a "fresh start" under
the Bankruptcy Code is tempered by section 523 which provides for the
survival of certain "nondischargeable" debts after discharge.'I In par-
10. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). Section 101(4) provides:
(4) Claim means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or un-
secured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured;
For a discussion of § 101(4), seeJulis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 223 (1981); Matthews, The Scope of Claims
Under the Bankruptcy Code (parts 1 & 2), 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 221, 339 (1983).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). Section 523(a) provides in pertinent
part:
(a) A discharge... does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt-
(2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extention, re-
newal, or refinance of credit, by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition; or
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for obtaining such money, property, services, or credit
reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with
intent to deceive;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement, or larceny;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity
or to the property of another entity;
(7) to the extent that such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss .
(c) [T]he debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in
paragraph (2), (4), (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on re-
quest of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a
hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge
under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of
this section.
Id.
Courts faced with interpreting § 523 have found little guidance in the legis-
lative history. See Tennessee v. Daugherty (In re Daugherty), 25 Bankr. 158, 161
[Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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ticular, section 523(a)(7) exempts from discharge debts arising from a
fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to a governmental unit that are not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 12 Also, the commencement or
continuation of criminal proceedings is excepted from section 362(a),
which provides for an automatic stay of all collection proceedings
against the debtor upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.1 3 The
bankruptcy laws, it is said, were not intended to provide a "haven for
criminal offenders." 14
A majority of the courts that have considered the effect of bank-
ruptcy on restitutive probation conditions have concluded that the fresh
start policy of the Bankruptcy Code should yield to the policy of avoid-
ing the creation of a refuge for criminal offenders. 15 These courts rea-
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (close reading of legislative history of § 523(a)(7) "no
more helpful in interpreting the statute than reading the text of the statute it-
self."); United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657, 661 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1983) (indicating agreement with the Daugherty court regarding the legislative
history of § 523(a)(7)).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). For a discussion of the operation of
§ 523(a)(7), see 3 COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY § 523.17 (15th ed. 1985).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982). Section 362 provides that "[t]he filing of
a petition.., does not operate as a stay-(l) under subsection (a) of this subsec-
tion, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding
against the debtor..." Id.
In discussing § 362(b)(1), the House Report expressed the view that "[t]he
bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are designed to give
relief from financial over-extension. Thus, criminal actions and proceedings
may proceed in spite of bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
342 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6299. For a
general discussion of the purpose and scope of § 362, see Note, Adequate Protec-
tion, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 21, 26-36 (1985).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6299.
15. See Commonwealth v. Oslager (In re Oslager), 46 Bankr. 58, 61-62
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (restitution ordered as condition of probation not a
"debt" under Bankruptcy Code even where state is victim); Pellegrino v. Divi-
sion of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42 Bankr. 129, 137-38 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1984) (restitution obligation not a "debt" under Bankruptcy Code and,
alternatively, nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7)); Cornell v. Director, Office of
Adult Probation (In re Cornell), 44 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (res-
titution obligation imposed as condition of probation "not a debt but a penalty
imposed by a state to enforce its criminal statutes"); Black Hawk County v. Vik
(In re Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (state imposed criminal
restitution order does not create debtor-creditor relationship between debtor
and victim or debtor and state); United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657,
662 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (obligation to pay costs of prosecution does not give
rise to debtor-creditor relationship); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616-17
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (obligation to pay restitution as condition of probation
not a "debt" under Bankruptcy Code and, alternatively, nondischargeable);
Magnifico v. Arizona (In re Magnifico), 21 Bankr. 800, 803 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982)
(restitution obligation not a "debt" where purpose of imposition is penal rather
than compensatory); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 694 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981)
(restitution order creates no right to payment in victim and, therefore, no
"debt" under Bankruptcy Code); but see Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson),
1986] NOTE 595
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son that a restitution condition is not a "debt" under the Code
definition and, alternatively, that the obligation is nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(7) regardless of its compensatory effect. 16 Re-
cently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 17 rejected the prevailing
view and held that criminal restitution obligations are dischargeable
debts under the Bankruptcy Code.' 8 In an effort to resolve the resulting
split of authority, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robinson.' 9
Additionally, legislation has been proposed which would overrule
Robinson.20
This note will review the leading cases involving the effect of bank-
ruptcy proceedings on restitutive conditions of probation. This note
will also highlight and analyze the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson.
Finally, this note will offer an alternative statutory interpretation which,
it is submitted, is consistent with the federal policy concerns implicated
by a debtor's attempt to discharge a criminal restitution obligation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Classifying the Criminal Restitution Obligation Under § 101
If a court determines that a criminal restitution obligation is not a
"debt," then the question of dischargeability is moot since only "debts"
are dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.2 ' A majority of bank-
ruptcy courts hold that criminal restitution obligations do not fall within
776 F.2d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 1985) (restitution obligation imposed as probation con-
dition creates dischargeable debt under Bankruptcy Code), cert. granted sub nom.
Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986); Brown v. Shriver (In re Brown), 39
Bankr. 820, 822 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (restitution order imposed as condi-
tion of probation creates a "debt" which is dischargeable).
16. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42
Bankr. 129, 132-38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (restitution requirement creates no
"debt" under § 101(11) and, alternatively, creates a nondischargeable debt
under § 523(a)(7 )).
17. 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106
S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
18. Id. at 41. For a discussion of Robinson, see infra notes 91-129 and ac-
companying text.
19. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
20. See H.R. 3742, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In response to the Robinson
decision, RepresentativeJohn G. Rowland (R. Conn.) introduced H.R. 3742, en-
titled the "Criminals Accountability Act of 1985," which would amend § 523(a)
by the addition of a new subsection (10). The proposed section 523(a)(10)
would make nondischargeable any debt stemming from a consent decree or
judgment requiring an individual to make restitution as a consequence of com-
mitting a crime. Id.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982) (discharge under Chapter 7 affects only
"debts"); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1982) (discharge under Chapter 11 affects only
"debts"); 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982) (discharge under Chapter 13 affects only
"debts").
[Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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the Code's definition of "debt."'22 The impact of this determination is
that the filing of a bankruptcy petition and subsequent discharge have
no effect on the debtor's obligation to pay restitution. 23
In In re Button,24 the debtor pleaded guilty to petty larceny and was
ordered to pay restitution to his victim as a condition of probation. 2 5
Subsequently, the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy and listed the
victim, the sentencing judge, and the probation department as credi-
tors. 26 After these creditors failed to file an objection to discharge, the
bankruptcy court discharged the debtor's restitution obligation. 27 One
22. See Commonwealth v. Oslager (In re Oslager), 46 Bankr. 58, 61-62
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (restitution ordered as a condition of probation not a
"debt" under Bankruptcy Code even where state is victim); Cornell v. Director,
Office of Adult Probation (In re Cornell), 44 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984) (restitution obligation as a condition of probation "not a debt but a pen-
alty imposed by a state to enforce its criminal statutes."); Black Hawk County v.
Vik (In re Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (state criminal restitu-
tion order does not create a debtor-creditor relationship between the debtor
and the victim or the state); United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657, 662
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (obligation to pay costs of prosecution does not give rise
to a debtor-creditor relationship); In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616-17 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983) (criminal restitution obligation as a condition of probation is not
a "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code); Arizona v. Magnifico (In re Magnifico), 21
Bankr. 800, 803 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (restitution obligation not a debt where
purpose of order is penal rather than compensatory); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692,
694 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (criminal restitution order creates no right to pay-
ment in the victim and is not a "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code).
In contrast, several courts have held that criminal restitution obligations are
"debts" subject to administration in bankruptcy. See Brown v. Shriver (In re
Brown), 39 Bankr. 820, 822 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (order of state criminal
court requiring payment of restitution as condition of probation creates "debt"
under Bankruptcy Code); Newton v. Fred Haley Poultry Farm (In re Newton), 15
Bankr. 708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (obligation to pay restitution as condi-
tion of probation creates "debt" where victim is empowered to enforce restitu-
tion order by levy and execution). See also Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38-39
(restitution order creates "debt" under § 101(11)).
23. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42
Bankr. 129, 135 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (restitution order creates no "debt" and
is "unaffected" by the discharge issued in bankruptcy).
24. 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
25. Id. at 693. The restitution award was in the amount of $7,597.26 and
was ordered in accordance with the authority provided sentencing judges under
New York law. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 6 5.10( 2 )(g) (McKinney 1980)). The
court ordered the debtor to pay the victim $25 every week until the award plus
interest was paid in full. Id.
26. 8 Bankr. at 693. The bankruptcy petition was filed approximately one
year after the restitution order was issued by the state sentencing judge. Id.
27. Id. The victim, Sheridan Oil Company, could have blocked discharge of
the underlying debt under § 523(a)(4) which excepts from discharge debts aris-
ing from larceny. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1982). Objections to discharge
under subsections (2), (4), or (6) of section 523(a), however, are waived unless
the creditor raises the objection during the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(c) (1982). In contrast, objections to discharge for fines, penalties, or for-
feitures payable to a governmental unit under section 523(a)(7) may be raised
subsequent to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), (c) (1982). For a discussion of
7
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month after discharge, the debtor was ordered to reappear before the
state sentencing judge for failing to make timely restitution payments in
violation of the terms of probation. 28 In response, the debtor filed a
motion in the bankruptcy court to enjoin enforcement of the restitution
condition by the sentencingjudge on the ground that the obligation was
discharged in his prior bankruptcy case. 29 The bankruptcy judge denied
the debtor's motion, holding that the restitution obligation was not a
"debt" and, therefore, not subject to discharge in the bankruptcy case.30
The Button court reasoned that, as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, the restitution order created no "right to payment" and, therefore,
no "claim" since the victim had no right to enforce the order under state
law.3 1 Under New York law, the sentencing court, not the victim, was
empowered to enforce the restitution order as part of its continued
power to supervise the probationary sentence.3 2 The court, therefore,
the dischargeability of criminal restitution obligations, see infra notes 71-90 and
accompanying text.
28. 8 Bankr. at 693.
29. Id. In support of his motion, the debtor asserted that the restitution
obligation constituted a debt which was not excepted from discharge as a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to a governmental entity. Id. He also argued that
the action to enforce the restitution obligation was brought for the benefit of the
victim/creditor and that the action amounted to a collection proceeding in viola-
tion of the "fresh start provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. For a discussion
of the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code, see supra notes 7-10 and
accompanying text.
30. Id. at 694. The court did not reach the issue of dischargeability under
§ 523(a)(7) since the absence of a "debt" removed the obligation from the scope
of the bankruptcy discharge order. See 1 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982) (Chapter 7 dis-
charge affects only "debts").
31. 8 Bankr. at 694. The court reasoned:
Under the new Bankruptcy Code, § 101(11) says the term "debt"
means liability on a claim. "Claim", pursuant to § 101(4) means right
to payment. "Creditor", according to § 101(9) generally means an en-
tity that has a claim against the debtor that arose before filing. From
these definitions, it does not appear that resititution could be consid-
ered a debt nor that a victim could be considered a creditor. With resti-
tution, the victim has no right to payment. It is the criminal court
which sets the restitution amount and if it is not paid the victim cannot
proceed against the debtor to enforce payment, but instead the proba-
tion officer must report the event of nonpayment to the court which in
turn determines if a violation of probation has occurred.
Id. State laws generally do not provide for victim enforcement of restitution
orders. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42
Bankr. 129, 132 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (applying Connecticut law); Black Hawk
County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (applying
Iowa law); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (applying
Colorado law). But see Newton v. Fred Haley Poultry Farm (In re Newton), 15
Bankr. 708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (restitution is a "debt" where victim is
empowered to enforce order by civil proceeding under state law). For a discus-
sion of state laws concerning enforcement of criminal restitution orders, see
Harland, supra note 1, at 108-19.
32. 8 Bankr. at 694. When the probationer refuses to pay the victim, the
598 [Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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concluded that, while the "debt" owed to the victim/creditor was dis-
charged,3 3 the restitution obligation owed to the state was not a "debt"
and, therefore, not subject to discharge in the bankruptcy case.3 4
In addition, the Button court, relying extensively on two state crimi-
nal cases, found that the bankruptcy laws should not affect criminal resti-
tution orders because the restitution obligation does not create a debt
or a debtor-creditor relationship. 35 Moreover, the court reasoned that
the legislative history of section 362(b)(1) indicates that the bankruptcy
laws were not intended to create a "haven for criminals." '3 6 The court
concluded that Congress did not intend for criminal judgments to be
subject to the bankruptcy discharge, and therefore, it held that a bank-
probation officer reports the nonpayment to the sentencing judge who, in turn,
determines whether the probationer violated probation. Id.
33. Id. The court found the obligation owing to the victim discharged since
the victim failed to file a timely objection to discharge under § 523(c). Id. For
the text of § 523, see supra note 11.
34. 8 Bankr. at 694. The court commented, "since the criminal proceeding
was a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New
York, this court does not believe that it has jurisdiction to interfere with the
sentence of the State Court." Id.
35. Id. (citing People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483
(1974); People v. Topping Bros., Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N.Y.S.2d 985
(1974)). Mosesson and Topping Bros., both decided prior to the 1978 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, held that bankruptcy proceedings have no effect upon
restitutive sanctions imposed by state criminal courts. See People v. Mosesson,
78 Misc. 2d 217, 218, 356 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (1974) (bankruptcy discharge is
insufficient ground for modification or discharge of restitutive probation condi-
tion); People v. Topping Bros., Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 262-63, 359 N.Y.S.2d 985,
987-88 (1974) (bankruptcy discharge is insufficient ground for dismissal of crim-
inal charges arising from discharged debt).
In Mosesson, the debtor entered a plea of guilty to charges of grand larceny
and forgery and was ordered to pay restitution as a condition of a five-year pro-
bationary sentence. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d at 217-18, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
Thereafter, he moved to discharge the requirement of restitution in view of his
discharge in bankruptcy. Id., 356 N.Y.S.2d at 484. The New York trial court
denied the debtor's motion stating:
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever upon a condition of
restitution of a criminal sentence. A bankruptcy proceeding is civil in
nature and is intended to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of
his debts and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A condition
of restitution in a sentence of probation is a part of the judgment of
conviction. It does not create a debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship
between the persons making and receiving restitution. As with any
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended as a means to
insure the defendant will lead a law-abiding life thereafter.
Id. at 218, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 484. The Button court read Mosesson and Topping Bros.
as establishing the principle that "an order for restitution does not create a
debtor-creditor relationship" under New York law. See Button, 8 Bankr. at 694.
36. See 8 Bankr. at 693-94 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
342 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6299). For a
discussion of the legislative history of § 362(b)(1), see supra note 13 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Robinson court's treatment of the legislative
history of section 362(b)(1), see infra note 111.
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ruptcy court is without jurisdiction to interfere with the sentence of a
state criminal court.3
7
In Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino),38s the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut also held that criminal resti-
tution obligations are not "debts" within the meaning of section
10 1(11). 3 9 In Pellegrino, the debtor was charged with fraudulently ob-
taining food stamps and was sentenced to five years probation condi-
tioned upon making restitution to the state of Connecticut. 40 As part of
the plea agreement, a wage execution was ordered on the wages of the
debtor's husband.4 1 Six months after sentencing, Mrs. Pellegrino and
her husband filed a joint petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code, listing various state agencies as unsecured creditors on the resti-
tution order.4 2 In spite of a discharge issued in due course by the bank-
ruptcy court, the state continued to enforce the wage execution.
4 3
37. 8 Bankr. at 694.
38. 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
39. Id. at 134-35. Although the court concluded that the restitutive obliga-
tion was not a "debt," it went on, in dicta, to discuss the dischargeability of the
obligation. Id. at 136-38. For a discussion of the Pellegrino court's dis-
chargeability analysis, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
40. 42 Bankr. at 131. The value of the fraudulently obtained food stamps
was $15,960. Id. Mrs. Pellegrino was initially sentenced to a two-year prison
term which was suspended, and she was placed on probation for a five-year term
conditioned upon payment of restitution. Id.
41. Id. Mrs. Pellegrino and her husband, in seeking a probationary sen-
tence, agreed to the imposition of a wage execution on Mr. Pellegrino's wages in
the amount of $40 per week. Id.
42. Id. The Pellegrinos listed the Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance (CDIM), the Bureau of Collection Services, and the Connecticut
Office of Adult Probation (COAP) as creditors on an apparent welfare fraud
claim estimated at $65,000 for the years 1969-83. The Pellegrinos, however, did
not specifically refer to the "restitution debt" in their bankruptcy schedule. Id.
at 131 n.2. Nevertheless, the restitution claim was not excepted from discharge
under § 523(a)(3) because the defendants received notice of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1982)).
The Pellegrino court did find that the common law debt arising from the lar-
ceny was a debt discharged under § 523(c) because the victim failed to object
during the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 132 n.7. The court, however, classi-
fied the "restitution debt" arising from the state sentencing judge's order as a
separate debt. Id. at 132-39.
43. Id. at 131. The plaintiffs alleged that continued enforcement of the
wage execution violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982)). The court disagreed, holding that en-
forcement of the wage execution was excepted from the automatic stay under
§ 362(b)(1) which excepts the continuation of a criminal proceeding against the
debtor. Id. at 135-36 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982)); see also Cornell v.
Director, Office of Adult Probation (In re Cornell), 44 Bankr. 528, 529-30
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (post-petition collection of restitution payments ex-
cepted by § 362(b)(1) from automatic stay); Black Hawk County v. Vik (In re
Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 65-66 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (post-petition approval of
debtor's plan of restitution not in violation of automatic stay because excepted
by § 362(b)(1)); Newton v. Fred Haley Poultry Farm (In re Newton), 15 Bankr.
708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (post-petition imposition of restitutive condi-
600 [Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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Subsequently, the Pellegrinos sought both a declaration from the bank-
ruptcy court that the restitution obligation was discharged and an order
enjoining enforcement of the restitution order on the state level.4 4
In denying the plaintiff's requested relief, the Pellegrino court fol-
lowed the "right to payment" statutory analysis which was introduced in
Button.4 5 The Pellegrino court reasoned that no debt arises from a crimi-
nal restitution order since the state administers repayment and the vic-
tim has no right to enforce the order under state law.4 6 In contrast to
the facts of Button, however, the state of Connecticut was both the victim
of the crime and the prosecuting party in Pellegrino.4 7 Since the state, as
crime victim, had enforcement rights, the state arguably had a "right to
tion by state sentencing judge not a violation of automatic stay because excepted
by § 362(b)(1)).
44. 42 Bankr. at 132. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of their civil
rights and requested appropriate damages and attorney's fees. Id. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1988 (1982).
45. 42 Bankr. at 132. For a discussion of Button, see supra notes 24-37 and
accompanying text.
46. 42 Bankr. at 132-33. The court commented:
The crime victim receives payments from the Office of Adult Probation.
Under the penal code, a victim cannot enforce a court's order of resti-
tution if the criminal defendant fails to make payments to the Office of
Adult Probation. The state court may, however, issue a warrant for the
arrest of the criminal defendant for violation of a condition of proba-
tion .... Since a crime victim has no "right to payment," restitution is
not a "debt" under Bankruptcy Code § 101(11).
Id. at 132.
The Connecticut statute provides that "[alt any time during the period of
probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a
warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of
probation . . .or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such
violation ...." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-32(a) (West 1985). Additionally,
while the probation officer has the power to arrest the defendant if the defend-
ant violates the conditions of probation, the victim has no express power to en-
force probation. Id. If it is established that the defendant violated the terms of
probation, "the court may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or con-
ditional release or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is
revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any
lesser sentence." Id. at § 53a-32(b).
The cases relied upon by the Pellegrino court in support of its conclusion that
a restitutive probation condition is not a "debt" all involved private victims. See
In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 615 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (150 private persons or
entities victimized by debtor's scheme to defraud); Arizona v. Magnifico (In re
Magnifico), 21 Bankr. 800, 801 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (bar owner and two pa-
trons victimized by debtor's aggravated assault where debtor repeatedly drove
van into the front wall of bar); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 693 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1981) (oil company victimized by debtor's petty larceny).
47. The Button court's "right to payment" rationale turned on the fact that
the ultimate recipient of the restitution had no enforcement rights under state
law. See Button, 8 Bankr. at 694. In Pellegrino, the Connecticut Department of
Income Maintenance was victimized and the Connecticut Office of Adult Proba-
tion was empowered to enforce the order under state law. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr.
at 134.
NOTE
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payment" under section 101 (4). The Pellegrino court reasoned, however,
that the state's prosecutorial agency was separate and distinct from the
state agency victimized by the criminal activity, and, therefore, as in But-
ton, the victim was without enforcement rights under state law.
48
In addition to its strict "claim" analysis, the Pellegrino court stressed
the differences between the criminal-state relationship and the tradi-
tional debtor-creditor relationship. 49 Notably, the court found restitu-
tive obligations "rooted" in the state's police power, holding that the
victim was a mere "incidental beneficiary" of the state's criminal law en-
forcement efforts. 50 "Clearly," the court concluded, "the plaintiff's
payments to the Office of Adult Probation are not a debtor's payments
to a creditor. ' '5i
Finally, while noting the absence of an express exception in the def-
inition of "debt" for obligations arising out of criminal proceedings, the
Pellegrino court relied upon considerations of federal-state comity52 and
48. 42 Bankr. at 134. The court reasoned:
Although several parts of the Connecticut governmental unit were
involved in the prosecution, collection, deposit and enforcement pro-
cess necessitated by Pellegrino's criminal conduct, each must be considered
as a separate entity in analyzing whether a debtor-creditor relationship was estab-
lished by the state court order of restitution. Therefore the mere fact that one
state agency was the actual victim of the crime and another part of the
same governmental unit prosecuted Pellegrino and may enforce the or-
der of restitution is an insufficient basis to create a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship ....
Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 133. The court stressed that the monetary obligation did not arise
from any "contractual, statutory or common law duty," but, rather, it arose
"from a court-ordered sanction following a criminal conviction." Id. Other
courts have similarly distinguished restitution obligations from more traditional
debtor-creditor obligations. See Black Hawk County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 Bankr.
64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) ("[T]he Court does not believe a state criminal
restitution order creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the Debtor and
the victim or the state."); United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657, 662
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) ("Defendant's obligation to pay the costs of prosecution
thus does not arise from any debtor-creditor relationship between him and
Plaintiff."); In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) ("Thus, it
appears that the Colorado legislature did not intend restitution to be a method
of debt collection and did not intend to create a debtor-creditor relationship
between the victim and the defendant .... "); In re Button, 68 Bankr. 692, 694
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[T]he above two New York (criminal) cases also indi-
cate that an order of restitution does not establish a debtor-creditor
relationship.").
50. 42 Bankr. at 133.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 134. The policy of avoiding federal interference with state crimi-
nal prosecutions is embodied in the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
which provides that "[A] court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The Bankruptcy Code, however, is an
"expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. See 11 U.S.C.
12
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the much-quoted "haven for criminals" language from the legislative
history of section 362(b)(1). 53 The Court concluded that it was neces-
sary to consider these policies in defining "debt" for bankruptcy pur-
poses "in order to avoid an anamolous result."
5 4
§ 105(a) (1982); see also Diners Club, Inc. v. Bumb, 421 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1970)
(jurisdiction of bankruptcy court in reorganization not limited by Anit-Injunc-
tion Act). However, even when acting under an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, federal courts are bound by considerations of comity, which dictate restraint
from interference with state prosecutions. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972).
In Mitchum, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief in a federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 from a state prosecutor's attempt to have the plaintiff's bookstore
closed down as a public nuisance. Id. at 228. The Supreme Court ruled that,
although § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,
federal courts remain bound by principles of equity and comity when consider-
ing the propriety of injunctive relief under § 1983 directed against state criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 243 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal
courts should not enjoin state criminal prosecutions absent showing of bad faith
and likelihood of irreparable injury if denied relief)).
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court introduced the principle of federal-
state comity, which Justice Black described as a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the en-
tire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
In Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), the Third Circuit upheld a bankruptcy
court's refusal to enjoin a state criminal prosecution, the success of which would
have required restitution under state law. 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982). In
reaching its decision, the court applied principles of comity, stating:
A federal court should be especially cautious in enjoining state
criminal proceedings, because of the state's paramount interest in pro-
tecting its citizens through its police power. In this case, there has been
no showing that Delaware has acted in bad faith in its prosecution, nor
any allegation that the Delaware courts have inadequate procedures for
hearing the federal challenges to a judgment of restitution. Therefore,
we cannot say that the Bankruptcy Court erred in refusing to interfere
with the state court proceedings.
Id. at 179 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of comity in the context of bank-
ruptcy courts' interference with state enforcement of restitution obligations, see
infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of bank-
ruptcy court abstention, see Reed, Sagar & Granoff, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
Abstention and Removal Under the New Federal Bankruptcy Law, 56 AM. BANKR. LJ.
121 (1982).
53. 42 Bankr. at 134. For a discussion of this statement of legislative intent,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
54. 42 Bankr. at 134. The court concluded:
With this congressional policy in mind, it would defy both logic and
reason to allow a convicted person, who has been ordered to make res-
titution to his victim in lieu of incarceration, to use the Bankruptcy
Code to escape the consequences of his crime. The definition of debt
must therefore be read in the context of that policy in order to avoid
that anomalous result.
13
Duffy: Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of Probati
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
604 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 591
Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson, Brown v. Shriver
(In re Brown)55 was the lone exception to the majority view that criminal
restitution obligations are not "debts" under the Bankruptcy Code.
56
The debtor in Brown, guilty of drunk driving, was ordered to pay restitu-
tion for property damage as a condition of probation. 5 7 The debtor,
having failed to pay restitution in a timely fashion, was requested to ap-
pear at a probation revocation hearing. 58 Prior to the hearing date, the
debtor filed a bankruptcy petition and subsequently received a discharge
of his restitution obligation.5 9 Prior to discharge, the debtor filed a
complaint in the bankruptcy court in an effort to permanently enjoin the
state from revoking his probation or taking any action to collect the res-
titution. 60 The bankruptcy court held that the restitution sentence of a
state criminal court is a dischargeable debt under the Bankruptcy Code,
and therefore it permanently enjoined enforcement of the restitution
order.6 '
55. 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
56. See Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 776 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.
1984) ("The lone exception, as far as we are aware, is In re Brown .... "), cert.
granted sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986); Pellegrino v. Division
of CriminalJustice (In re Pellegrino), 42 Bankr. 129, 133 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984)
(recognizing Brown as the lone exception to the great weight of authority that
criminal restitution obligations are not "debts").
57. 39 Bankr. at 821. The debtor had crashed into the victim's home caus-
ing an estimated $1500 in damages. Id. The restitution award was set in accord-
ance with the damage. Id. Before sentencing, Brown completed the
requirements of a "pretrial diversion program" by refraining from alcohol-re-
lated offenses and submitting to alcohol rehabilitative treatment, but he failed to
pay the restitution award. Id. Consequently, the restitution requirement was
carried over as a condition of probation. Id.
58. Id. On October 1, 1982, the debtor was notified that a hearing was set
for October 15, 1982. Id.
59. Id. The bankruptcy petition was filed on January 31, 1983, with the
victim scheduled as an unsecured creditor. The District Attorney received no-
tice of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, neither the state nor the victim
filed objections and the debtor received a discharge from the restitution obliga-
tion on August 9, 1983. Id. at 821 n.2.
60. Id. at 821. After the District Attorney received notice of the bankruptcy
petition, the probation revocation hearing was continued until June 17, 1983,
when the debtor requested an injunction from the bankruptcy court. Id. For a
discussion of the court's order enjoining the state from seeking to revoke proba-
tion for nonpayment of restitution, see infra note 168.
61. Id. at 830. The court intimated the possibility of a conflict with the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment if revocation
of probation were made automatic upon nonpayment and the debtor was finan-
cially unable to pay. Id. at 830 n.19 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983) (due process and equal protection violated where revocation of proba-
tion occurs automatically upon failure to pay restitution or fine and defendant is
unable to pay restitution or fine)). For a discussion of Bearden, see generally
Comment, Constitutional Law-Imprisoning Indigents for Failure to Pay Fine-
Bearden v. Georgia-, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 111 (1985); Note, Equal Protection
and Revocation of an Indigent's Probation for Failure to Meet Monetary Conditions:
Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 Wis. L. REV. (1985).
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In reaching its decision, the Brown court focused on the legislative
history of section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded that
Congress intended the definition of "claim" to encompass all legal obli-
gations of the debtor.6 2 Unlike the Pellegrino and Button courts, the court
in Brown refused to compromise the broad fresh start policy underlying
the Code's definition of "claim." ' 63 The court reasoned that no provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code excluded restitutive obligations arising
from a criminal sentence from the scope of "claim." '64
' The Brown court reasoned that, for purposes of the Code, the claim
underlying the debtor's restitutive obligation arose when the debtor
damaged the victim's property.6 5 The tort liability arising from the
property damage was fully cognizable in bankruptcy. 66 Therefore, the
restitutive obligation, which the court viewed as equivalent to a judg-
It has also been suggested that restitution orders from state criminal courts
may conflict with the Supremacy Clause where such orders interfere with the
effectiveness of bankruptcy relief. See Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d
176, 178 (3d Cir. 1982) (imposition of restitution penalty in state criminal action
"may indeed raise serious questions under the Supremacy Clause" where under-
lying debt was discharged in bankruptcy).
62. 39 Bankr. at 822 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309
(1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5808, 6266). The Court reasoned that the definition
of "debt" is not limited to "obligations incurred in consumer or business trans-
actions, but includes all obligations, however incurred." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(11) (1982)).
The Brown court specifically rejected the approach taken by the Button court.
39 Bankr. at 822. Judge Ludlin wrote:
This court cannot accept the narrow conception of "debt" adopted
in Button. The relationship memorialized by a criminal court award of
restitution is not beyond the scope of "debt" for bankruptcy purposes.
"Debt" dischargeable in bankruptcy is not restricted to obligations in-
curred in consumer or business transactions, but includes all obliga-
tions, however incurred.
Id. (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the Button court's statutory analy-
sis, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 822-23. The court concluded that creation of an exception to
§ 101 (4) for criminal restitution obligations would require "a level of distortion
of language most appropriate for the actions of legislatures and not courts." Id.
at 822.
64. Id. The court noted that "[i]f the right of payment and the liability in a
criminal court order of restitution were intended to be outside of the realm of
debt for bankruptcy purposes, then how simple would it have been for Congress
to include appropriate language in the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 822-23.
65. Id. at 822. In identifying the "claim" as arising upon the debtor's com-
mission of the tort, the Brown court made clear its intention to treat the victim's
claim and the state's claim as creating a single debt. Id. The court rejected the
notion that the state's claim was independent of the victim's tort claim against
the debtor. Id. The court viewed the criminal court's order as analogous to a
civil court's reduction of a victim's tort claim to judgment. Id.
66. Id. The definition of "claim" encompasses any right to payment
"whether or not such right is reduced to judgment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
For the text of § 10 1(4), see supra note 10.
19861 NOTE 605
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ment on the underlying debt, was a debt subject to discharge.6 7 The
Brown court found no relevant distinction between civil and criminal
judgments for purposes of interpreting the definition of "claim." 68 It
reasoned that the restitutive probation order merely acknowledged the
victim's "right to payment" and confirmed the debtor's liability on the
claim.69 Furthermore, the court found no reason to exclude a criminal
court's order simply because the criminal court can enforce or collect
the restitution payments.
70
B. Dischargeability and the Operation of Section 523(a)(7)
Even if a restitutive obligation is a debt under section 101(11), it
still must be dischargeable for the debtor to be free from the obligation.
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts certain types of debts
from discharge in bankruptcy. 7 1 Of particular applicability is section
523(a)(7) which excepts from discharge debts arising from a "fine, pen-
alty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit"
67. 39 Bankr. at 822. Cases following the Button rationale hold that the
restitution award is wholly separate from the underlying tort claim since the pur-
pose of the order is penal and not compensatory. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division
of CriminaiJustice (In re Pellegrino), 42 Bankr. 129, 137 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984)
(restitution "part of the criminal penalty rather than compensation for a victim's
actual loss").
68. 39 Bankr. at 822. The court reasoned that, "[if] the Bankruptcy Code
said that only orders to pay money by civil courts are debts for bankruptcy pur-
poses, then credence could be given to the defendant's argument that a criminal
court restitution order does not embody a 'debt' dischargeable in bankruptcy."
Id. (emphasis in original). Since Congress did not distinguish civil orders from
criminal orders in the definition of "debt" or "claim," the court refused to hold
that criminal restitution obligations are not "debts." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court stated that:
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that only civil courts enter
orders to pay money that are subject to discharge in bankruptcy. A
restitution order by a criminal court no less acknowledges the existence
of a debt than an order of a civil court reducing that claim to judgment.
The fact that a criminal court might participate in enforcement or col-
lection of the debt between victim and debtor/defendant does not
make the underlying obligation a "nondebt" for bankruptcy purposes.
Id. Unlike the Brown court, cases following Button draw a sharp distinction be-
tween the criminal restitution obligation and the underlying tort claim held by
the victim. See, e.g., Cornell v. Director, Office of Adult Probation (In re Cornell),
44 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (restitution obligation is a penalty
imposed by the state for criminal law enforcement purposes); Black Hawk
County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (victim and
state treated separately for purposes of determining existence of debt); Pelle-
grino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42 Bankr. 129, 132 n.7
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (indicating that victim's claim was discharged but that
restitution obligation is separate matter); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (victim and state treated separately for purposes of de-
termining existence of debt).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). For the relevant text of§ 523, seesupra note
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that are "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss .... -72 Courts
that have considered the dischargeability of restitutive obligations are
split on the applicability of section 523(a)(7). 73
Although it held that a restitution order does not create a "debt"
and, therefore, is not subject to discharge, the Pellegrino court discussed
the dischargeability of criminal restitution obligations as an alternative
rationale for its holding.74 The debtor in Pellegrino argued that, in es-
sence, the restitution order amounted to "compensation for actual pecu-
niary loss," and, as such, fell outside the scope of section 523(a)(7). 7 5
Focusing on the language of Connecticut's probation statute,7 6 the
court rejected the debtor's argument and concluded that the restitution
order fits within section 523(a)(7). 77 The primary purpose behind the
statutorily sanctioned conditions of probation, the court concluded, was
rehabilitation of the offender, not compensation for the victim. 78 Thus,
72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
73. See, e.g., Pelligrino, 42 Bankr. at 136-39 (criminal restitution not dis-
chargeable under § 523(a)(7)); Brown, 39 Bankr. at 824 (restitution obligation
dischargeable in spite of § 523(a)(7)).
74. 42 Bankr. at 136-39. For a discussion of the Pellegrino court's holding
that a restitution obligation is not a debt, see supra notes 38-54 and accompany-
ing text.
75. 42 Bankr. at 136.
76. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a) (West 1985). The Connecticut
statute provides, in pertinent part:
When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge,
the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant:
... (4) make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make restitution,
in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for
the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount
thereof and the manner of performance; ... (9) satisfy any other condi-
tions reasonably related to his rehabilitation ....
Id. The statute also allows for modification of the restitutive condition or an
enlargement of time within which to comply with a restitution order. Id. at
§ 53a-30(c).
77. 42 Bankr. at 136. In support of its conclusion, the court relied upon the
language of the catchall provision, § 53a-30(a)(9), which authorizes any condi-
tions "reasonably related to [the defendant's] rehabilitation." Id. at 136 (citing
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(9) (West 1985)). The court also noted that
Connecticut law:
authorizes the court to modify or enlarge the conditions of probation
for good cause shown during the period of the probation. That statu-
tory scheme reinforces the conclusion that the focus of restitution, as
with the other methods of conditional release, is upon the offender and
not on the victim, and that restitution is part of the criminal penalty
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss.
42 Bankr. at 137.
78. Id. at 136-39. Characterizing the victim as an "incidental beneficiary"
of the restitution order, the court stressed the relationship between the state and
the criminal and concluded:
Justice is the end result when the rule of law is interpreted with com-
mon sense, reason, and simple fairness. Here a convicted felon and her
husband, who wished to save her from incarceration, pleaded for
lieniency [sic] in the state court. She was spared the penalty of incar-
1986] NOTE
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the incidental compensatory effect resulting from the restitution pay-
ments was insufficient to render the debt "compensation for actual pe-
cuniary loss." 79 The Pellegrino court, however, did leave open the
possibility of a different outcome if the debtor could demonstrate a com-
pensatory purpose behind the criminal prosecution.8"
ceration on the condition that restitution would be made. The plaintiffs
now come to this court to repudiate that obligation, claiming that the
Bankruptcy Code provides that relief. It does not.
Id. at 138.
79. Two courts of appeals have held that a federal sentencing judge is not
precluded from ordering restitution as a condition of probation where the un-
derlying debt arising from the criminal conduct was discharged in a prior bank-
ruptcy action. See United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir.
1984) (refusing to void restitutive condition of probation where underlying debt
had been discharged in prior bankruptcy action); United States v. Carson, 669
F.2d 216, 216-18 (5th Cir. 1982) (same). Arguably, these cases merely stand for
the proposition that debts arising post-discharge are unaffected by the discharge
order. See Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 776 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.
1985) (Carson and Alexander not controlling where restitution order entered prior
to discharge since both cases involved post-discharge restitution orders which
are not subject to discharge under § 727(b)). However, the courts in both Alex-
ander and Carson stressed the rehabilitative purpose behind the restitution order
and intimated that a compensatory purpose would render the restitution order
violative of the discharge. See Alexander, 743 F.2d at 480; Carson, 669 F.2d at 217.
The Carson court stated:
If the principal aim of the probation condition were to make the [vic-
tim] whole, [the argument that the restitution order violates the dis-
charge] might have some appeal. In fact, though, while recompense to
the victim is a usually laudable consequence of restitution, the focus of
any probation regimen is on the offender. The order of probation is
"an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment.., intended
as a reforming discipline."
Carson, 669 F.2d at 217 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435
(1943)). Carson and Alexander have been read as supportive of the Pellegrino ap-
proach to dischargeability. See, e.g., Black Hawk County v. Vik (In re Vik), 45
Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (citing Carson and Alexander in support of
its holding that criminal restitution obligations are not "debts" under Bank-
ruptcy Code).
80. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 138. The court cited with approval cases holding
that state criminal prosecutions may be enjoined under § 105 where the purpose
of the prosecution is debt collection. Id. (citing Alan I.W. Frank Corp. v. P.M.A.
Inc. (In re Alan I.W. Frank Corp.), 19 Bankr. 41, 42-44 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(state criminal prosecution enjoined under § 105 where purpose was debt col-
lection and prosecution would interfere with bankruptcy relief); Strassmann v.
Du-Art Foods, Inc., (In re Strassmann), 18 Bankr. 346, 347 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982) (same); Whitaker v. Lockert (In re Whitaker), 16 Bankr. 917, 922 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1982) (same); Taylor v. Widdowson (In re Taylor), 16 Bankr. 323,
325 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (same)).
Section 105 grants bankruptcy courts broad injunctive power to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982). The Taylor court outlined
the inquiry under § 105 as follows:
The nature of the moving force behind the institution of the criminal
proceeding is the determinative factor. Prosecutions instituted primar-
ily to vindicate the public welfare by punishing criminal conduct of the
608
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In Brown, however, the bankruptcy court held that the restitution
obligation was not excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(7). 8 l The
court found that the purpose behind Tennessee's statutory authoriza-
tion of restitution is to compensate the victims of crime, not to rehabili-
tate the offender. 82 The Brown court noted that Brown made the
restitutive payments directly to the victim, not to a government
agency,8 3 and that the District Attorney initiated probation revocation
proceedings at the urging of the victim. 84 The court was also influenced
by the District Attorney's testimony that payment of the restitution by
Debtor and to discourage similar conduct of others are not usually in-
terfered with by Bankruptcy Courts. When it is clear that the principal
motivation is neither punishment nor a sense of public duty, but rather
to obtain payment of a dischargeable debt either by an order of restitu-
tion or by compromise of the criminal charge upon payment of the civil
obligation, the Bankruptcy Court may properly enjoin the criminal
proceeding.
Taylor, 16 Bankr. at 325-26.
81. Brown, 39 Bankr. at 823-26. The court noted that the exceptions to
discharge provided in § 523(a) are strictly construed in favor of the debtor to
foster comprehensive relief and a fresh start for the debtor. Id. at 823 (citing
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (purpose of Bankruptcy Code is to
provide fresh start unhampered by pre-existing debts); Household Finance
Corp. v. Danns (In re Danns), 558 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (exceptions to
discharge narrowly construed in favor of debtor)).
82. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-304 (1982). The Tennessee statute
provides:
(a) A sentencing court may direct a defendant to make restitution to
the victim of the offense as a condition of probation.
(c) The court shall specify at the time of the sentencing hearing the
amount and time of payment or other restitution to the victim and pay
permit payment or performance in installments ....
(d) In determining the amount and method of payment or other resti-
tution, the court shall consider the financial resources and future liabil-
ity of the defendant to pay or perform.
Id. The statute also provides for waiver or modification of the resititution condi-
tion after petition by the defendant, victim, or district attorney general, for good
cause shown after notice and a hearing of which the victim is given notice. Id.,
40-35-304(0. The statute also provides that the trial judge may issue a warrant
for the defendant's arrest "[w]henever it shall come to [his] attention" that the
defendant has violated the conditions of probation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-21-
107 (1982).
83. Brown, 39 Bankr. at 824. Although the statute does not speak directly to
the method of payment, it is clear from the trial record in Brown that the victim
was receiving payments directly from Mr. Brown. Id. at 825 (citing record at 41,
Brown).
84. 39 Bankr. at 825. In support of this finding, the court quoted the fol-
lowing portion of the District Attorney's deposition:
The victim would tell us he [Brown] has or hasn't made restitution. Mr.
Brown would say, "Please give me some more time" and I would give him some
more time. Then three or four months later the victim would call me again and say
he has done nothing. Then we would set the case [probation revocation
hearing] again, and each time this process would go on.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
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the offender's insurance carrier or other third parties would satisfy the
probation condition.8 5 Because the court found that the restitution con-
dition was ordered for a compensatory purpose, it discharged the resti-
tution obligation because the criminal court can enforce or collect the
restitution payments.8 6
In discussing the availability of injunctive relief against revocation
of probation proceedings, the Brown court acknowledged the federal
policy of noninterference with state criminal prosecutions. 8 7 The court
found, however, that the principle of comity was outweighed by congres-
sional intent to protect federally discharged debtors from state collec-
tion practices which vitiate the fresh start goal of bankruptcy.8 8 The
court concluded that where a criminal proceeding is initiated or contin-
85. Id. at 825-26. In support of its conclusion that the restitution obligation
was primarily compensatory, the court noted that the sentencing court set the
amount of the restitution award in accordance with the damage to the victim's
property, rather than by the nature of the criminal conduct. Id. at 825.
86. Id. at 826. In conclusion, the court stated that, "[t]he District Attor-
ney's office is not seeking to vindicate the right of the citizens of the State of
Tennessee, it is just trying to force Brown to pay [the victim]. The restitution
award is a debt discharged in this bankruptcy case." Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
Cases following the Button approach have similarly held that, where the pur-
pose of the restitution award is compensatory, the obligation is dischargeable
under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice
(In re Pellegrino), 42 Bankr. 129, 138 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (distinguishing
cases where a prosecutor initiates criminal proceedings for the purpose of col-
lecting the underlying debt). Despite its reliance on the particular facts of the
case, however, the Brown decision is cited as the "lone exception" to the pre-
Robinson rule because of its strong criticism of the approach advocated by Button
and its progeny.
87. 39 Bankr. at 826 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal
courts should refrain from enjoining state criminal prosecutions unless prosecu-
tion is brought in bad faith and irreparable injury will result absent injunction)).
The Brown court noted that the principle of comity is embodied in
§ 362(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts the continuation or com-
mencement of criminal proceedings from the operation of the automatic stay.
Id. at 827 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982)). The court noted, however, that
state criminal proceedings are not excepted from the scope of the discharge in-
junction. Id. at 828 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982)).
88. Id. at 829. The court stressed the expansive scope of the discharge in-
junction under § 524(a), and pointed to legislative history indicating that the
discharge injunction was "intended to insure that once a debt is discharged,
debtor will not be pressured in any way to repay it." Id. at 828 n. 14 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1978), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5866, 6321-22)).
The court also relied on bankruptcy decisions holding that states could be en-
joined from enforcing restitutive sanctions resulting from state "bad check"
prosecutions. Id. at 829 (citing Taylor v. Widdowson (In re Taylor), 16 Bankr.
323, 325-28 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (state prosection enjoined under § 105 power
where criminal prosecution instituted for purpose of debt collection); Barnette
v. K-MART (In re Barnette), 15 Bankr. 504, 512 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (state
precluded from ordering civil restitution remedy as part of criminal proceeding
since civil remedy would conflict with discharge injunction and would be void
under Supremacy Clause)).
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ued for the purpose of recovering a discharged debt, federal court inter-
ference is justified as a necessary exercise of the bankruptcy court's
power to effectuate its judgment of discharge.8 9 Thus, the court en-
joined further enforcement of the restitutive condition of probation by
Tennessee prosecutors. 90
III. IN RE ROBINSON
Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held, in Robinson, that a state court's order to pay restitu-
tion as a condition of probation creates a dischargeable debt under the
Bankruptcy Code. 9 1 The plaintiff, Carolyn Robinson, was convicted in a
Connecticut court for wrongfully receiving public assistance benefits
from the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance (CDIM). 92
She was sentenced to a five-year term of probation conditioned on her
making restitution to CDIM. 93 Three months after sentencing, Robin-
son filed a petition under Chapter 7 in which she listed several state
89. Brown, 39 Bankr. at 829. The court acknowledged that consideration of
comity required restraint from interference with the state prosecution. Id. at
826 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). In fact, the court noted that
the principle of comity was embodied in § 362(b)(1), which excepts criminal
proceedings from the operation of the automatic stay. Id. at 827 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982)). However, the court reasoned that no such exception
for criminal proceedings could be found in § 524, which provides for the re-
placement of the automatic stay with a broader "discharge injunction." Id. at
828 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982) (providing for injunction against "any
act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt")). The court concluded:
A criminal proceeding continued or initiated to recover or collect a dis-
charged debt is enjoined by the § 524 discharge injunction and falls
outside the protection afforded by the Anti-Injunction Act. Considera-
tions of comity and equity are overcome by the stated Congressional
preference to protect discharged debtors ....
Id. at 829. The court acknowledged the legitimacy of the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from criminal acts and stated that it would not intervene if the
state imposed a sanction of imprisonment or a "nondischargeable fine". Id. at
829 n.16.
90. Id. at 830.
91. 776 F.2d at 40-41. The Second Circuit panel consisted of Circuit
Judges Mansfield and Kearse and District Judge Pratt. Id. at 31. Judge Kearse
wrote the opinion of the court;Judge Mansfield concurred in a separate opinion.
Id. at 31; id. at 41 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 31-32. While she was receiving social security benefits, Robinson
accepted $9,932.95 in public assistance benefits from the CDIM. Id. Her ac-
tions constituted larceny under Connecticut law. Id. at 31, 39.
93. Id. at 32. Initially, the Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson
to serve a prison term of one to three years. See Robinson v. Director, Office of
Adult Probation (In re Robinson), 45 Bankr. 423, 423-24 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984). Ultimately, she was placed on probation conditioned on her paying resti-
tution in the amount of $9,932.95 to the Connecticut Office of Adult Probation
(COAP) in monthly installments of $100. 776 F.2d at 32. Compliance with the
terms of the order would have resulted in her making restitution in the amount
of $5,800.00 instead of the $9,932.95 wrongfully received. See Robinson, 45
Bankr. at 424 n.2.
NOTE
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agencies, including CDIM, as having claims for "public assistance" ben-
efits and "restitution." '9 4 Despite being notified of Robinson's petition
in bankruptcy, the state agencies did not object to discharge in a timely
manner. 9 5 Consequently, six months after sentencing, Robinson's resti-
tution obligation was discharged. 9 6
Nearly three years after discharge, the Connecticut Office of Adult
Probation (COAP) informed Robinson that it intended to enforce the
restitution obligation. 9 7 In response, Robinson filed a complaint in the
bankruptcy court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the restitution ob-
ligation was discharged and an order enjoining the state from taking any
action to collect the restitution debt. 9 8 The bankruptcy judge, relying on
his previous decision in Pellegrino,99 denied the plaintiff relief, holding
that the restitution order did not give rise to a debt and, alternatively,
that it was excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(7).10 0 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit reversed on both grounds. 10 1
In holding that the restitution obligation constituted a "debt," the
94. 776 F.2d at 32. Robinson was sentenced on November 14, 1980, and
the petition in bankruptcy was filed on February 5, 1981. Id. Robinson listed
CDIM as a creditor having a claim of $6,000 for "public assistance" and COAP
as having a claim of $9,932.95 for "restitution." Id.
95. Id. The bankruptcy court notified both CDIM and COAP of the filing of
Robinson's bankruptcy petition and the last date for the filing of objections to
discharge. Id. Neither agency responded to this notice. Id. For a discussion of
the consequences of the state's failure to file a timely proof of claim or objection
to discharge, see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
96. 776 F.2d at 32. Shortly after the discharge, Robinson's attorney noti-
fied COAP that Robinson considered the debt for restitution discharged and,
therefore, she would make no further payments. Id. COAP did not respond to
the attorney's communication and Robinson stopped making payments. Id.
97. Id. COAP informed Robinson that it considered the restitution debt
"valid and not dischargeable" and that it "intended to enforce the [restitution]
order to the fullest extent possible." Id. at 32. The reason for COAP's three-
year delay in enforcing restitution by the State did not appear in the court's
opinion.
98. Id. Robinson also sought an award of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Robinson v. Director, Office of Adult Probation (In re Robinson), 45 Bankr. 423,
424 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984). The defendants raised various defenses and claims
of immunity to Robinson's claim for damages which the bankruptcy court did
not reach. Id. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded for consideration of
the damages issue. 776 F.2d at 41.
99. Bankruptcy Judge Alan Shiff decided both Pellegyino and Robinson in the
bankruptcy court. See Robinson, 45 Bankr. at 423; Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 131.
For a discussion of Pellegrino, see supra notes 38-55 & 75-81 and accompanying
text.
100. Robinson, 45 Bankr. at 424 (citing In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984)). The bankruptcy court in Robinson stated that "[t]he
facts in this proceeding, the issues raised, and the relief sought by the plaintiff
are virtually identical to those in [Pellegrino]. Accordingly, the.., legal conclu-
sions, reached in Pelegrino, are adopted to the facts here." Id. (citation omitted).
101. 776 F.2d at 38-39, 41.
612 [Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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Second Circuit relied upon the broad language in the Code's definition
of "claim" and the legislative history of section 101(4).102 The court
pointed to legislative history indicating that Congress sought the
broadest possible definition of claim "intending that virtually all obliga-
tions to pay money be amenable to treatment in bankruptcy proceed-
ings."' 10 3 Viewing section 101(4) with this predilection, the court
rejected the Pellegrino analysis of section 101(4). 104
The Robinson court, rejecting the approach of the majority of courts
which focused solely on whether the victim had a "right to payment,"
concluded that section 101(4) was satisfied because the Restitution or-
der vested an enforceable "right to payment" in COAP, the state proba-
tion department. 10 5 The Second Circuit found no relevant distinction
between traditional civil enforcement by levy and execution and "the
threat of revocation of probation and incarceration" for a violation of
probation.' 0 6 Thus, the court held that COAP had a "right to payment"
102. Id. at 33-36 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6266). For a dis-
cussion of the legislative history of § 101 (4), see infra notes 137-46 and accom-
panying text.
103. 776 F.2d at 34. In addition, the court cited cases for the proposition
that Congress intended the relief under § 101(4) to be broad. 776 F.2d at 35
(citing Ohio v. Kovacs, ("broad"); Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., Inc. (In re
M. Frenville Co., Inc.), 744 F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1984) ("very broad"), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985); Kallen v. Litas, 47 Bankr. 977, 982 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1985) ("broadest possible"); In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 244
n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("extremely broad"); Iowa v. Thomas (In re
Thomas), 12 Bankr. 432, 433 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981) ("could not be
broader")).
104. 776 F.2d at 33-34. The Second Circuit commented:
In sum, we see no support in the language, the legislative history, or
the statutory scheme as a whole for the view adopted by the Pellegrino
line of cases that unless the victim of the crime has a right of payment, a
criminal restitution obligation is not a debt within the meaning of the
Code.
Id. at 36. For a discussion of Pellegrino, see supra notes 38-55 & 75-81 and accom-
panying text.
105. 776 F.2d at 38. The Second Circuit expressly rejected the Petlegrino
approach, which focused solely on whether the victim had a "right to payment."
Id. at 34. The court reasoned that a restitution obligation is a debt if "any per-
son or entity, not just the crime victim, has a right to payment." Id. (emphasis
supplied by the court).
106. Id. The court stated:
Nor is it relevant that the right is enforceable by the threat of revoca-
tion of probation and incarceration rather than by the threat of levy and
execution on the debtor's property. The right is not the less cognizable
because the obligor must suffer loss of freedom rather than loss of
property upon failure to pay.
Id. The sentencing judge and COAP were responsible for enforcing the restitu-
tion order. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-32(a), 54-108 (West 1985).
Under the statute, probation officers have the authority to arrest a delinquent
probationer and bring him before a sentencing judge. Id. § 53a-32(a). The
court may then revoke probation and incarcerate the probationer if he has vio-
lated a condition of probation. Id. § 53a-32(b).
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and the power to enforce payment sufficient to create a debt for pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Code.10 7
The Robinson court also found the policy against providing a "haven
for criminals" in bankruptcy an unpersuasive rationale for excluding
restitution obligations from the definition of "debt."' 0 8 The court
pointed out that the quote from the legislative history' 0 9 supporting this
argument was taken from the legislative history accompanying the auto-
matic stay provision, section 362, which contains an express exception
for criminal proceedings.' 10 The legislative history of section 101 con-
tains no such limiting language. I I Moreover, the court listed several
Code provisions that evinced congressional intent to include criminal
court orders within the definition of "debt."' 12
Focusing on section 523, which excepts certain "debts" from dis-
charge, the court noted that the exceptions include criminal fines'1 3 and
debts arising from crimes such as larceny' 14 and fraud.' 15 According to
the Second Circuit, Congress, by specifically treating criminally based
obligations in the complex provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, struck a
balance between the policy favoring a comprehensive fresh start and the
desire to avoid creating a refuge for criminals. 1 16 The Robinson court
107. 776 F.2d at 38-39.
108. Id. at 37-38. For a discussion of the reliance on this rationale by the
Pellegrino court, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
109. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6299. For a discussion of this quote
from the legislative history, see supra note 13.
110. 776 F.2d at 37. The court regarded this legislative history as only sup-
portive of the exception from stay for "criminal action[s] or proceeding[s]
against the debtor." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982)).
111. 776 F.2d at 37. For a discussion of the legislative history to §§ 101(4)
and 101(1 1), see supra notes 7-10 & 137-46 and accompanying text.
112. 776 F.2d at 37-38.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). For a discussion of the legislative his-
tory of § 523, see supra note 11.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1982).
115. Id. § 523(a)(2). Since § 523 deals with the dischargeability of "debts",
the court reasoned that the inclusion of criminal obligations within its provisions
clearly indicated congressional intent to include such obligations within the defi-
nition of "debt". 776 F.2d at 37. In addition, the exceptions for debts arising
from larceny and fraud are waived unless raised in a timely manner. See 11
U.S.C. § 523(c) (1982). For the text of § 523, see supra note 11.
116. 776 F.2d at 37-38. The court stated:
[I]t is plain that Congress was attentive to the possibility that the bank-
ruptcy laws might be invoked by criminals in an effort to retain their
unlawful gains, and it enacted both provisions that thwart those efforts,
and provisions that, despite those efforts, give precedence to the bank-
ruptcy laws' aim to provide relief for financial overextension. Thus ...
§ 362(b)(1) makes the automatic stay of pending proceedings inapplica-
ble to criminal proceedings against the debtor; § 523(a)(7) makes cer-
tain obligations to pay money to governmental bodies
nondischargeable. On the other hand .... § 523(c) of the Code pro-
vides that debts for crimes such as larceny and fraud "shall be dis-
[Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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concluded that a judicial reordering of priorities established by Con-
gress in the complex statutory scheme would be inappropriate." 7
Having decided that the restitution order created a debt, the Robin-
son court analyzed whether the debt was dischargeable.' 1 8 Because the
state agencies waived their rights under section 523(a)(2) or (4) by not
objecting to discharge," l 9 the court focused on whether the restitution
debt fit within the section 523(a)(7) exception for fines, penalties, and
forfeitures payable to a governmental unit which are not compensation
for actual pecuniary loss.'
2 0
The Robinson court initially noted that the language of section
523(a)(7) excepts debts only "to the extent" that they fall within its pro-
visions. 12 1 Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned that for purposes of dis-
charge, a fine or penalty payable to a governmental unit can be
separated into its penal and compensatory components. 122 Since the
victim was the beneficiary of the restitution order, the amount of which
was measured by the victim's losses, 12 3 the court found "inescapable"
the conclusion that the debt was, at least to some extent, designed as
charged" unless the creditor to whom such a debt is owed files an
objection ....
Id.
117. Id. The court commented that "[i]t is inappropriate for a court, based
on its own view as to the relative importance of that policy, to create judicial
exceptions to the clear language of the statute that are warranted neither by that
language nor by the legislative history." Id. (citing Central Trust Co. v. Official
Creditor's Committee of Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 357-60 (1982)
(per curiam); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
118. Id. at 39-41.
119. Id. at 32. The Second Circuit observed that timely objection to the
discharge of the restitution obligation would probably have resulted in a deter-
mination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) (for fraud) or § 523(a)(4) (for
larceny). Id. at 39 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), 523(a)(6) (1982)). The court
stated:
[T]he bankruptcy court gave COAP and CDIM notice in February 1981
that their claims were listed in Robinson's petition; that April 27, 1981,
was the last day for filing objections to discharge or complaints to de-
termine dischargeability under § 523(c); and that the failure by that
date to file a complaint as to the dischargeability of a debt under
§§ 523(a)(2) or (4) might result in discharge of the debt .... We sus-
pect that had objection been made on the ground that the debt was for
an established larceny, the court would have excepted it from dis-
charge, and the case would not be before us now.
Id. For the relevant text of § 523, see supra note 11.
120. 776 F.2d at 39. For a discussion of § 523 including its text, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
121. 776 F.2d at 40 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982)). For the text of
§ 523, see supra note 11.
122. 776 F.2d at 40. The court reasoned that, by excepting debts "to the
extent" that they meet the specifications of § 523(a)(7), Congress recognized the
possibility that a debt could fall within more than one category of debt created
by the code. Id.
123. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-30(a)(4) (West 1985) ("make restitu-
tion of the fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to
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"compensation for actual pecuniary loss."'124 In determining the extent
of the debt's compensatory character, the court held that, to the extent
that the restitution award did not exceed the amount of the pecuniary
loss suffered by the victim, the debt was compensatory and, therefore,
dischargeable.1 2 5 Thus, the restitution award in Robinson, which did not
exceed the amount of the victim's loss, was fully dischargeable.1 26 As a
result, the Robinson court entered judgment declaring the debt dis-
charged, thereby enjoining the State of Connecticut from taking any fur-
ther action to recover the restitution debt.' 2 7
In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield firmly endorsed the
majority's analysis but he expressed dissatisfaction with the "unfortu-
nate result."' 128 Judge Mansfield expressed his hope that Congress
would amend section 523(a)(7) to render criminal restitution obligations
pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby
....").
124. 776 F.2d at 40 (citing United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 177 (4th
Cir. 1984)). In Dudley, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether a
restitution order abates upon the death of the defendant during the pendency of
an appeal, as would a criminal fine or forfeiture. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 176. The
restitution order at issue in Dudley was imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3579
(1982), which provides for a victim's right of civil enforcement. See 739 F.2d at
178 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982)). The court held that the state, as victim,
could enforce the order in spite of the defendant's death and distinguished resti-
tution under the federal statute from more traditional forms of punishment.
Dudley, 739 F.2d at 177-78. The court held that, unlike traditional forms of pun-
ishment which have penal and rehabilitative aims, the dominant purpose of resti-
tution under the federal statute is to compensate the victim. Id. at 177. It
should be noted, however, that the Connecticut probation statute does not pro-
vide for enforcement by the victim. See Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 132, 137 (noting
that Connecticut statute does not provide for victim enforcement and reasoning
that Connecticut statutory scheme reinforces notion that purpose of restitution
is not compensatory).
125. 776 F.2d at 40. The court stated that a restitution debt would not be
dischargeable to the extent that it exceeded the amount of the actual pecuniary
loss of the victim. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Connecticut statute
limits restitution to the "loss or damage caused" by the criminal offense. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West 1985).
126. 776 F.2d at 40.
127. Id. Because the court held that the obligation was a debt which was
discharged in the bankruptcy case, the § 524(a)(2) injunction was triggered au-
tomatically. Id. at 41 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982) (providing for injunc-
tion against all acts to recover discharged debts)). Perhaps because the
injunction was automatic, the court did not discuss considerations of federal-
state comity. Id.
128. 776 F.2d at 41-42 (Mansfield, J., concurring). In many cases, noted
Judge Mansfield, the effect of the rule propounded by the court "will be to stul-
tify and render useless criminal restitution payments as a means of punishing
[criminals]." Id. at 41 (Mansfield, J., concurring). Moreover, Judge Mansfield
could not perceive a meaningful distinction between restitution and other forms
of pecuniary punishment, such as fines or penalties, sufficient to justify different
treatment under § 523. Id. at 41-42 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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nondischargeable. 129
IV. ANALYSIS
In Robinson, the Second Circuit rejected the then prevailing position
of bankruptcy courts and held that criminal restitution obligations are
debts which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. 13 0 If upheld by the
Supreme Court, this decision would have a profound and potentially ad-
verse effect on state criminal sentencing.' 3 ' It is suggested that the
Supreme Court should reverse the Second Circuit's decision on both
statutory and policy grounds.
Where restitution is ordered as a condition of probation, a tripartite
relationship is formed between the victim, the criminal/debtor and the
state.' 3 2 Within this relationship, the bankruptcy court must initially de-
termine the existence of a "claim" giving rise to a "debt" for purposes
of treatment in the bankruptcy case.13 3 The courts agree that a victim
who has no statutory right to enforce a restitution order has no right to
payment and, therefore, no claim under section 1 0 1 (4 ).134 A majority of
courts which have dealt with the question have relied upon this reason-
ing and have failed adequately to address the possibility of a claim aris-
ing from the criminal-state relationship. 135 It is submitted that the
Robinson court was correct in evaluating the criminal-state relationship
for purposes of determining the existence of a claim under section
101(4).136 Claim is defined in terms of"a right," which, by the absence
of restrictive language, is sufficiently broad to encompass a relationship
between the criminal/debtor and the state.i3 7 It is suggested, however,
129. Id. at 42. For a discussion of a proposed amendment to § 523, see
supra note 20.
130. For a discussion of the Robinson decision, see supra notes 91-129.
131. For a listing of states which permit restitution as a sentencing condi-
tion, see supra note 1.
132. For a discussion of the relationships formed upon imposition of a resi-
tution obligation, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the definitions of "debt" and "claim" in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice (In re Pellegrino), 42
Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (victim has no right to payment so obligation
is not a debt); In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (same); Ari-
zona v. Magnifico (In re Magnifico), 21 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (same);
In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); but see Newton v. Fred
Haley Poultry Farm (In re Newton), 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (vic-
tim has recourse to seek enforcement of restitution order in civil court under
Georgia law, therefore restitution order creates a "debt").
135. See, e.g., Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 134 (court determined that state had no
right to payment under the Bankruptcy Code for "policy" reasons); In re Button,
8 Bankr. 692.
136. For a discussion of the state's enforcement rights under the Connecti-
cut statutory scheme, see supra note 46. For a general discussion of the enforce-
ment of criminal restitution orders, see Harland, supra note 1, at 108-18.
137. For the text of § 101(4), see supra note 10.
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that, while the Second Circuit correctly examined the debtor-state rela-
tionship, it incorrectly applied section 101(4) by failing to consider the
impact of section 101(4)(B).
The definition of "claim" in section 101(4) was amended just prior
to passage to include section 101(4) (B).13 8 The provision, as amended,
reads:
(4) "claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, con-
tingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such right gives rise to a right of payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, secured, or unsecured.13 9
The addition of section 101(4)(B) makes it clear that Congress in-
tended to exclude from the definition of "claim" any right to an equitable
remedy which does not give rise to an alternative "right to payment"
upon breach of performance.' 40 The House and Senate reports, relied
upon by the court in Robinson,14 1 were prepared prior to the inclusion of
the present section 101 (4)(B), and erroneously indicate that a right to an
equitable remedy which does not give rise to an alternative right to pay-
ment is a claim under section 101(4).142 Subsequent legislative history
indicates clearly, however, that a right to an equitable performance, the
breach of which does not give rise to a right to payment, is not a
claim. 143
138. See Matthews, supra note 10, at 235-36.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
140. See Matthews, supra note 10, at 235-36.
141. 776 F.2d at 38.
142. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6266 (describing the definition of
"claim" as including "an equitable right to performance that does not give rise
to a right to payment"); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5808 (same).
143. See 125 CONG. REC. H 11089 (daily ed. September 28, 1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6437-38 (statement of Rep. Edwards);
124 CONG. REC. S17406 (daily ed. October 6, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6505, 6506 (statement of Sen. DiConcini). The statements
are identical, indicating that
[slection l01(4)(B) represents a modification of the House-passed
bill to include in the definition of "claim" a right to an equitable rem-
edy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment .... For example, in some States, a judgment for specific
performance may be satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the
event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled to spe-
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It is submitted that the state has no "claim" in the criminal restitu-
tion context where, as in Robinson, the state's exclusive remedy for
breach of the restitutive condition is revocation of the probationary sen-
tence. Although the state's interest is difficult to categorize in standard
debtor-creditor terms, its interest is analogous to an equitable right of
rescission unaccompanied by an alternative right to enforce payment of
the monetary obligation. This is the type of obligation that section
101(4)(B), as enacted, was designed to exclude from the parameters of
"claim" for bankruptcy purposes.
The Second Circuit, in advocating an expansive reading of section
101(4), relied upon legislative history that evinced congressional intent
"that all legal obligations of the debtor ... will be able to be dealt with in
the bankruptcy case."' 144 This language, however, accompanied a pro-
posed but unadopted version of section 101(4) which included within
the definition of claim equitable remedies not giving rise to a right to
payment. 14'5 Contrary to the Second Circuit's characterization, Con-
gress did not intend to cover all legal obligations in the definition of
"claim". Congress clearly intended section 101(4)(B) to exclude from
the definition of claim any right to performance, the breach of which
does not give rise to a right to payment. 146 It is submitted that where
the state's exclusive remedy for breach of a restitutive condition is revo-
cation of probation, the state has not satisfied section 101(4)(B).
The Robinson court found no significant distinction between the
state's right to revoke probation and a creditor's right to enforce pay-
ment by levy and execution on the debtor's property."4 7 While both
methods of enforcement compel performance of the underlying obliga-
tion, it is contended that the distinction is dispositive in light of section
101(4)(B) and the purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code. The Bank-
ruptcy Code was intended to provide relief for the debtor who is over-
whelmed by financial overextension. 14 8  It would seem logical,
therefore, to exclude from bankruptcy disposition those creditors who
do not hold an unconditional right to financial satisfaction of their legal
claims. Where the debtor (criminal) agrees to the imposition of a finan-
cial obligation (restitution) in order to avoid a more onerous duty of
cific performance would have a "claim" for purposes of a proceeding
under title 11.
On the other hand, rights to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance with respect to which such breach does not give rise to a
right to payment are not "claims" and would therefore not be suscepti-
ble to discharge in bankruptcy.
Id.
144. 776 F.2d at 34 (emphasis in original).
145. See Matthews, supra note 10, at 235-36.
146. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
147. 776 F.2d at 38.
148. For a discussion of the legislative intent behind the Bankruptcy Code,
see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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performance (incarceration) and the creditor (state) holds no right to
enforcement of the obligation against the property of the debtor's es-
tate, but only a right to equitable relief (revocation of probation), then
the obligation is not an otherwise unavoidable source of financial over-
extension. It is submitted, therefore, that section 101(4)(B) renders the
state's rights against the debtor insufficient to constitute a "claim" since,
upon breach of performance of the restitutive condition, the state's only
remedy is an equitable right to seek revocation of probation.
Where the victim or the state holds an unconditional right to en-
force payment of the restitution order under state law,149 then the con-
clusion that there exists a "debt" is unavoidable and courts must decide
upon the application of section 523(a)(7). 150 The Robinson court held
that the imposition of a restitution obligation as a condition of proba-
tion is necessarily compensatory in purpose and, therefore, dischargea-
ble in spite of section 523(a)(7).1 5 1 The alternative analysis, followed by
a majority of courts, is to indulge in the presumption that restitution
conditions are imposed for a rehabilitative purpose unless the evidence
indicates otherwise. 152 The majority approach, it is suggested, repre-
sents the better view in light of the strong federal policy concerns com-
promised by the Robinson approach.' 5 3 Where a state prosecution is
actually motivated by a desire to circumvent the bankruptcy discharge,
the bankruptcy courts retain sufficient injunctive power under section
105 to protect the integrity of bankruptcy relief.' 5 4
149. See, e.g., Newton v. Fred Haley Poultry Farm (In re Newton), 15 Bankr.
708, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). In Newton, the court held that an order to pay
restitution as a condition of probation is a debt under Georgia law. Id. at 710.
According to the court, the controlling factor in Newton was the fact that, under
Georgia law, a victim is empowered to enforce the restitution order as a civiljudgment by execution. Id.; see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-13 (Supp. 1985) (provid-
ing that restitution order is enforceable "as is a civil judgment by execution").
150. See id.; see also Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 132-33 (citing Newton as authority
for proposition that victim's right to enforcement of restitution order is control-
ling question under § 101(4)).
151. Arguably, the Robinson court imputed an improper motive to the Con-
necticut sentencing court since the Connecticut probation scheme seems to fo-
cus exclusively on rehabilitative purposes. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
30(a) (West 1985) (empowering sentencing court to impose certain enumerated
conditions of probation and "any other conditions reasonably related to his re-
habilitation."); see also Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 504, 91 A. 369, 370 (1914)
(purpose for probation is reformatory and the "end sought is the good of the
individual wrongdoer").
152. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 136-37.
153. For a discussion of these policy concerns, see infra notes 162-75 and
accompanying text.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982). Section 105 provides, in pertinent part:
"The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Id.; see also State Finance Co. v.
Morrow, 216 F.2d 676, 679-80 (10th Cir. 1954) (bankruptcy courts have equita-
ble power to guard the integrity of their decrees).
Where the purpose of the state criminal prosecution is the circumvention of
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It is submitted that the first step toward any meaningful analysis of
the criminal restitution obligation in bankruptcy requires a recognition
of the fact that standard rules of statutory construction compel no spe-
cific result. 155 Restitution, when ordered as a condition of probation,
creates a unique financial obligation which, unlike more standard forms
of indebtedness, does not fall neatly into any of the various categories of
"debt" provided in the Bankruptcy Code. 156 In arguing over the pro-
priety of any given statutory interpretation, judges and practitioners can
expect to find little guidance in the plain language or legislative history
the bankruptcy laws, and the debtor establishes this fact, then an injunction
would not be inconsistent with the principle of comity since the state prosecu-
tion would presumably be in "bad faith." See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54
(1971) (comity does not preclude injunction of state prosecution which is
brought in bad faith).
Several bankruptcy courts have followed this approach, enjoining state
criminal prosections under § 105 where the purpose of the prosecution is to
compensate the victim of the criminal offense. See In re Curley, 25 Bankr. 260
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Ohio Waste Services, Inc. v. Fra-Mar Tire Services, Inc.
(In re Ohio Waste Services, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 59 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Alan
I.W. Frank Corp. v. P.M.A., Inc. (In re Alan I.W. Frank Corp.), 19 Bankr. 41
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Strassmann v. Du-Art Foods, Inc. (In re Strassmann), 18
Bankr. 346 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Whitaker v. Ockert (In re Whitaker), 16 Bankr. 917
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Taylor v. Widdowson (In re Taylor), 16 Bankr. 323
(Bankr. D. Md. 1981); Kaping v. Oregon (In re Kaping), 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1981); Bray v. Holley (In re Bray), 12 Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In
re Lake, 11 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Reid v. Young (In re Reid), 9
Bankr. 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 1980); Barth v. Broshot (In re Barth), 4 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
155. As a general matter, the rules of statutory construction require a court
to determine the legislative will from an examination of the plain language and
legislative history of the relevant statute. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 337 (1979) (proper statutory interpretation must begin with examination of
the language employed by Congress); Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., Inc., 577 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1978) (legislative history should
always be consulted because plain language may be misleading). For a general
discussion of the rules of statutory construction, see Posner, Statutory Interpreta-
tion-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
263 (1982); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1947).
156. See Zemans, Coercion to Restitution: Criminal Processing of Civil Disputes, 2
LAw & POL'V Q 81 (1980) (criminal restitution award uniquely combines ele-
ments of penal and restitutive justice); see also Mehler, Criminal Prosecution and
Restitution Under the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ANN. SERV. AM. L. 817 (1983) (discuss-
ing juridical sanctions as either penal or restitutive).
To the extent that the debt arises from an adjudication of criminal guilt, it is
of penal character. See Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 776 F.2d 30, 40
(2d Cir. 1985) (restitution order "intended in part to punish the defendant and
foster his rehabilitation."), cert. granted sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson, 106 S. Ct.
1181 (1986). Unlike a fine, however, satisfaction of the obligation has the effect
of compensating the victim's personal loss and is, therefore, restitutive. See 776
F.2d at 40 (restitution award is punitive, rehabilitative, and compensatory in pur-
pose); see also United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1984) (restitu-
tion order has both penal and compensatory purposes).
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of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 157
Without the aid of those determinative guideposts, it is suggested
that a thorough searching of the various policies implicated in the dis-
charge of criminal restitution obligations is vital to a responsible statu-
tory interpretation. 158 Too often, it is submitted, courts faced with
administration of a criminal restitution obligation have indulged in the
luxury of conclusory characterizations that lead to a simple and uncom-
plicated application of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions. 159 The Robin-
son court left the policy determinations necessary to an honest
resolution of the issue exclusively with Congress.' 60 Given the absence
of a determinative statement of congressional intent, 161 however, it is
suggested that guidance be drawn from other congressionally articu-
lated policy concerns, including the general policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Reform Act itself.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains a
clear statement of congressional intent to avoid the creation of a refuge
for criminal offenders. 16 2 The House Report states that "the bank-
ruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are designed to
give relief from financial over-extension. Thus, criminal actions and
proceedings may proceed in spite of bankruptcy."' 163 The Robinson
court dismissed this statement of legislative intent because it appears in
157. For a discussion of the legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
158. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it has been suggested that pol-
icy concerns should guide a court's interpretation where the plain language and
legislative history of a statute do not dictate a particular result. See Posner, Statu-
tory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 820
(1983). Judge Posner explains:
[W]hat if the judge's scrupulous search for the legislative will turns up
nothing? There are of course such cases, and they have to be decided
some way. It is inevitable, and therefore legitimate, for the judge in
such a case to be moved by considerations that cannot be referred back
to legislative purpose. There might be considerations... drawn from
some broadly based conception of the public interest.
Id.
159. See, e.g., In re Brown, 39 Bankr. at 822 ("To win their argument, the
defendants must first characterize the restitution order as being disembodied
from the underlying 'debt' created by [the debtor's] actions."); In re Pellegrino,
42 Bankr. at 134 (no "debtor/creditor relationship" arises between criminal and
state and, therefore, no "debt" under § 101(11)).
160. Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38 (refusing to "create judicial exceptions to the
clear language of the statute that are warranted neither by that language nor by
the legislative history"); but see In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 134 (exception to
§ 101 (11) found in federal policies implicated in criminal restitution context).
161. For a discussion of proposed legislation which would render criminal
restitution obligations nondischargeable, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
162. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6299.
163. Id.
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the discussion of the automatic stay provisions of section 362 and not in
the provisions defining "debt" or "claim."' 64 It is submitted, however,
that the quoted language clearly establishes a broad policy directive con-
cerning the very purpose and design of the entire Bankruptcy Code. 16 5
In addition, the principle of federal-state comity, embodied in the
Anti-Injunction Act 166 and firmly embedded in federal common law,
strongly suggests restraint by federal courts from interference with state
criminal prosecutions.' 6 7 By enjoining the state from enforcing the res-
titution order, the Robinson court extinguished a condition placed upon
a criminal sentence imposed by the state court, and permanently altered
the disposition chosen by the state trial judge. 16 8 Moreover, the Robin-
son decision may serve to curtail state courts' freedom to choose among
rehabilitative sentencing options in the future, to the extent that those
options are placed in danger of extinguishment through bankruptcy.
In Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 169 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit refused to enjoin the continuation of a "bad
check" prosecution where a conviction would have resulted in an order
164. 776 F.2d at 37. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra
notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
165. Several courts have read this statement of legislative intent as a broad
policy directive for application beyond interpreting § 362(b)(1). See, e.g., Black
Hawk County, Iowa v. Vik (In re Vik), 45 Bankr. 64, 65 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984)
(relying upon legislative history of § 362(b)(1) in support of holding that crimi-
nal restitution obligation not a "debt"); Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 134 (same);
United States v. Cox (In re Cox), 33 Bankr. 657, 660 (M.D. Ga. 1983) (relying
upon legislative history to § 362(b)(1) as support for holding that order to pay
costs of prosecution is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7)); In re Johnson, 32
Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (relying upon legislative history to
§ 362(b)(1) as support for holding that criminal restitution obligation not a
"debt" under § 101(11)).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). For a discussion of § 2283 and comity, see
supra note 52.
167. For a discussion of comity, see supra note 52.
168. The Second Circuit directed the district court to discharge Robinson's
restitution obligation and to enjoin defendants from attempting to recover fur-
ther restitution payments. 776 F.2d at 41. See also Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 138(analyzing restitution condition as a quid pro quo for probationary sentence in
bargain reached between criminal and state). Such interference with a state
court's sentencing power compromises the fundamental police functions of the
state government in enforcing its criminal laws. See Davis v. Sheldon (In re Da-
vis), 691 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1982) (refusing to enjoin state criminal prosecu-
tion where underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy because of the "state's
paramount interest in protecting its citizens through its police power").
It is unclear whether an unconditional probation would violate an order
which merely enjoined attempts at collection of the debt. The Brown court was
clearer in ordering the state to refrain from "seeking to revoke Brown's proba-
tion for failure to make restitution discharged in bankruptcy." Brown, 39 Bankr.
at 830. For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 55-70 & 81-90 and accompany-
ing text.
169. 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982).
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to pay restitution on a discharged debt. 170 Relying upon the principle
of comity enunciated by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris,171 the
Third Circuit reasoned that state criminal prosecutions should not be
enjoined absent compelling circumstances involving bad faith on the
part of the state prosecutor. 172 Analyzing the case under section 105,
the Davis court reasoned that, while the complaining witnesses may have
been motivated by a desire to avoid the consequences of the discharge,
the debtor failed to establish bad faith on the part of the prosecutor. 173
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the debtor could raise his federal
challenges in the state court. 174
It is submitted that the approach adopted by the Davis court repre-
sents the proper approach to criminal restitution obligations in bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy courts should exercise restraint when called upon to
alter a sentence imposed by a state criminal court. The integrity of the
discharge order can be adequately protected under the bankruptcy
courts' general injunctive power, giving proper consideration to the var-
ious policies implicated in the criminal restitution cases.
170. Id. at 179. The debtor was prosecuted under the Delaware "bad
check" law, which provides that knowingly issuing a worthless check is a class
"A" misdemeanor. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 900 (Supp. 1984). The Dela-
ware Code mandates a requirement of restitution upon conviction of a violation
of § 900. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4206(a) (1979).
171. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a discussion of Younger, see supra note 52.
172. Davis, 691 F.2d at 179. Judge Adams concluded:
Federalism in this nation relies in large part on the proper func-
tioning of two separate court systems. The integrity of each must be
preserved so that both can serve as effective forums for protecting indi-
vidual rights and societal interests. Therefore, federal courts must re-
main vigilant not to diminish the rightful perogatives of their state
counterparts, and should exercise their power to enjoin state criminal
proceedings only with considerable caution and indeed only when
proper cause has been shown.
Id.
173. Id. at 178-79.
174. Id. at 179. It should be noted that, under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), a criminal debtor is protected
from a state's revocation of probation if the debtor is unable to make restitution
payments because of his financial condition. Id. at 665, 674. In Bearden, the
Court held that, where a criminal debtor makes bona fide efforts to comply with
the restitutive condition, a state may not revoke probation and order incarcera-
tion unless alternative modes of punishment are inadequate to meet the state's
interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Id. at 674. The Court based its decision
upon due process and equal protection considerations. Id. at 665. It is sug-
gested that the Court's decision in Bearden provides bankrupt debtors with ade-
quate protection from discriminatory treatment on the state level. The
constitutional protection provided by Bearden ensures that restraint by federal
courts from interference with state criminal prosecutions will not leave the
debtor without protection from arbitrary treatment in the state court.
624 [Vol. 3 1: p. 591
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V. CONCLUSION
In deciding Kelly v. Robinson, 175 it is respectfully suggested that the
Supreme Court consider the operation of section 101(4)(B) in deciding
upon the propriety of the Second Circuit's conclusion that the State of
Connecticut holds a "claim" against Carolyn Robinson. Alternatively, it
is suggested that the Court consider formulating a rule which would
mandate the presumption of a non-compensatory purpose behind state
criminal courts' restitutive orders. Finally, it is suggested that the Court
redirect federal judges to consider the principle of comity when called
upon to interfere with a state's enforcement of its criminal laws.
Seamus C. Duffy
175. Cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
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